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FROM EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
 
TO INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to 
supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectual humility is a 
central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, 
this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtue-
theoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of 
intellectual humility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial 
knowledge is concerned, this stripe of epistemic anti-individualism leads to a particular 
account of intellectual humility. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Virtue epistemology is roughly the project of assigning paramount importance to intellectual 
virtues (often broadly conceived) in accounting for a range of positive epistemic statues. In 
particular, an influential wing of contemporary virtue epistemology is preoccupied with the 
theory of knowledge.1 These virtue epistemologists aim to characterise knowledge in purely 
virtue-theoretic terms, without appeal to any separate modal condition. Call such a view 
robust virtue epistemology (RVE). 
 
Some proponents of RVE understand the relevant virtues in terms of reliable cognitive abilities. 
Hence, their view also goes under the name virtue reliabilism. Thus, following Ernest Sosa (2007; 2011), 
a belief counts as knowledge if true because of (or through) the appropriate exercise of reliable 
cognitive ability.2 Interestingly, other friends of RVE also seek to explain knowledge in virtue-
theoretic terminology, yet they understand intellectual virtues specifically in terms of refined character 
traits. This view is known as virtue responsibilism. Thus, Linda Zagzebski (1996, 271) defines knowledge 
as a true belief state that arises out of acts of intellectual virtue, where such acts are, roughly, what 
someone with that virtue would do in the right circumstances as they arise from its motivational 
component. So, while virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism agree on the key 
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role that intellectual virtues should play in theorizing about knowledge, the latter takes a more 
restrictive line on what can count as an intellectual virtue.3 For now, we will follow virtue 
reliabilists in understanding the intellectual virtues very broadly, such that they include reliable 
cognitive abilities, though we will be returning to consider virtue responsibilism towards the 
end of the paper. In particular, we will be arguing that a particular metaphysical view about the 
nature of cognitive abilities in the context of testimonial knowledge leads to a particular 
normative view about intellectual character traits with regard to such knowledge. 
 
We shall proceed as follows. §2 argues that an influential version of RVE is committed to 
an individualistic conception of cognitive abilities according to which they supervene on internal 
physical features of individuals. §3 constructs an argument against RVE when understood along 
such individualistic lines. The argument shows that when a hearer acquires testimonial 
knowledge, the truth of her belief in the target proposition, as proffered by the speaker, is not 
entirely because of a cognitive ability that supervenes on such features. §4 develops an outline of 
what intellectual humility consists in. Traditionally, intellectually humble individuals are those 
who neither overrate their strengths nor underrate their weaknesses, but our claim is that neither 
overrating weaknesses nor underrating strengths are equally characteristic features of such 
individuals. §5 then provides an argument from such an anti-individualistic conception of 
cognitive abilities to the indispensability of intellectual humility, thus understood, in an account 
of those character traits that are needed when acquiring testimonial knowledge. Finally, §6 
contains some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
 
2. ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND EPISTEMIC INDIVIDUALISM 
 
 
Let’s consider Sosa’s version of RVE in more detail. On his view (2007; 2009), an achievement is 
an apt performance, where a performance is apt when accurate because adroit. As an example of a 
performance having such a triple-A analysis, take the achievement of a master archer who in 
normal circumstances hits the target when dispatching an arrow. The aptness of her 
performance consists in the success being because of (or through) the skill. The ‘because of’ 
relation is to be understood in terms of the manifestation of a competence (or disposition). So, the 
archer’s performance is an achievement in that hitting the innermost ring is a manifestation of 
her competence to do so when distance to target, visibility, and weather conditions are normal. 
In more recent work, Sosa (2015) proposes a triple-S analysis of a complete competence 
comprising an innermost S-competence, which is the seat (or skill), an inner SS-competence, 
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which is the combination of seat and shape, and a complete SSS-competence, which is the 
conjunction of seat, shape and situation. As an example, if the complete competence is being a 
competent driver of a vehicle on a certain occasion, then the seat is the basic driving skill, the 
shape is being awake, sober, alert, etc., and the situation is being seated at the wheel, in a reliable 
vehicle, on a dry road, etc. The connection between the triple-A analysis of a performance and 
the triple-S analysis of a competence is the following: a performance is apt when its success 
manifests competence, which happens just in case the innermost skill causally produces the 
success in combination with the appropriate shape and situation. The seat of the competence is 
determined as the causal basis for a success-response of an object when subjected to a stimulus in 
certain shape and situation combinations. Since a complete competence is necessarily a 
competence to succeed when trying for some outcome—such that if one tried, one would very 
likely succeed—no such competence can bring about that outcome. Only the innermost seat can 
do that when the shape and situation are conducive to the outcome. 
 
Let’s now transpose Sosa’s framework to an epistemological setting. On his view, 
knowledge is a cognitive achievement in the sense that knowledge involves a belief which is a 
performance exhibiting a similar triple-A structure: the belief is apt just in case it is true (accurate) 
because of (or through) cognitive ability (adroitness). In short, knowledge is apt belief. In the 
case of knowledge, a cognitive ability is to be understood as a cognitive competence (or 
disposition) to believe truly when circumstances are normal, which means that the ‘because of’ 
relation is a manifestation of such competence in normal circumstances. So, knowledge is an 
achievement in that believing truly manifests a cognitive competence to do so when 
circumstances are normal. Exactly what it means for circumstances to be normal is an important 
question to which we shall shortly return. Note for now that Sosa’s triple-S analysis of a 
complete competence also applies to cognitive competences. Knowledge requires the possession 
of a complete cognitive competence comprising the conjunction of seat, shape and situation. 
Suppose individual S acquires knowledge on the basis of visual experience. In that case, the seat 
is S’s visual apparatus (e.g., optic nerve and retinal receptors), the shape is S’s current bodily and 
mental state, (e.g., awake and attentive), and the situation comprises proximate environmental 
features (e.g., visibility and distance). What we have so-far called ‘normal circumstances’ thus 
corresponds to what Sosa dubs ‘situation’. 
 
The key point for present purposes concerns Sosa’s conception of the seat (or skill) as it 
pertains to knowledge. On his view, when S knows S gets things right through her own cognitive 
abilities, where the latter are thought of along individualistic lines as being located where S is and 
as having a physical basis resident in S. Here is Sosa: 
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[A] competence is a disposition, one with its basis resident in the competent agent, one 
that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of 
any relevant performance issued by it. (Sosa 2007, 29) 
 
Indeed, RVE is often expressed in terms of how when S knows, the truth of her belief is primarily 
creditable to her cognitive ability (or competence).4 (Note that this is a weaker claim than that S 
has knowledge only if the truth of her belief is exclusively down to her cognitive ability, which is 
implausible by any reckoning, as the exercise of such ability depends on favorable environmental 
conditions being in place—e.g., visual perception depends on suitable lighting conditions). For S 
to possess a cognitive ability such that the most salient factor in S’s cognitive success is the exercise 
of that ability requires the existence of a physical basis within her bodily boundaries on which 
that ability supervenes.5 If instead that physical basis were to extend beyond the skin-and-skull of 
S to include features of the physical or social environment, then the cognitive success would be 
down to an ability that was possessed by the conjunction of S and those external features. 
 
By way of illustration, consider a familiar case involving knowledge-undermining luck. 
Suppose S forms the belief that there’s a sheep in the field on the basis of a visual experience as 
of a sheep. Unbeknownst to S, she is looking at a sheep-shaped object. Nevertheless, S believes 
truly as there happens to be a real sheep behind that object. Such Gettier-style cases present no 
difficulty for RVE. The reason is that while S both exercises her own ability (to form visual 
beliefs) and believes truly, the truth of that belief is not because of that ability, because S does not 
believe truly in circumstances that are normal for its exercise. Rather, the belief that S forms is 
true because of incidental features of her environment.6 More accurately, while S’s success may 
be to some degree creditable to her ability—after all, had the object not been sheep-shaped, S 
would not even have formed the belief—it’s not primarily creditable to that ability. Environmental 
happenstance is what most saliently explains why S hit on the truth. 
 
So, RVE has a lot going for it. Nevertheless, we shall in the next section present an 
argument against RVE when understood along individualistic lines. Let’s work our target 
view into shape by defining two versions of RVE. Take an individualistic feature to be any 
mental or physical feature located inside the bodily boundaries of an individual. Consider 
then first what might be called Individualistic Robust Virtue Epistemology: 
 
(I-RVE)  
Necessarily, if individual S forms a belief which is true through manifesting cognitive ability A, 
then S has individualistic feature I, such that any individualistic duplicate S* also forms the 
same belief in such a way that its truth is through manifesting A. 
 
Our fake-sheep case illustrates the falsity of I-RVE. Suppose S, who is looking at a genuine 
sheep, forms a true belief that there’s sheep in the field through manifesting her cognitive ability 
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A. It does not follow that S’s individualistic duplicate S*, who is facing a sheep-shaped 
object, also thereby manifests A when she forms a true belief with the same content. While S 
straightforwardly acquires knowledge, the intervening epistemic luck prevents S* from gaining 
knowledge. Crucially, as we saw, Sosa’s RVE can handle such cases: since S’s belief is apt and 
S*’s belief is inapt, only the former counts as knowledge. So, I-RVE imposes an unduly 
demanding type of individualism on Sosa’s RVE. 
 
Here’s a better tack. The key difference between S and S* pertains to their proximate 
environment. That is to say, the reason the truth of S’s belief is through manifesting A, while the 
truth of S*’s belief is not, is that they form their respective beliefs on the basis of looking at 
different objects. The truth of a perceptual belief about an object is because of A only if formed 
on the basis of a perception of that very object. Otherwise, the conditions for exercising A 
would be deemed abnormal. Let’s use ‘local conditions’ to pick out those proximate 
environmental features which differentiate S from S*. Consider then a weaker version of I-RVE: 
 
(I-RVE*)  
Necessarily, if individual S forms a belief which is true through manifesting cognitive ability A, then 
S has individualistic feature I under local conditions L such that any individualistic duplicate S* who 
also forms that belief under L does so in such a way that its truth is through manifesting 
A. 
 
Note that I-RVE* does not predict that S has knowledge when forming a true belief on the basis 
of looking at a sheep if and only if her individualistic duplicate S* also has knowledge when 
forming the same true belief on the basis of looking at a sheep-shaped object. The reason is that 
the different objects S and S* confront make for a difference in their local conditions. 
Consequently, while S believes truly through manifesting A, the truth of S*’s belief is down to 
environmental coincidence. Hence, by the lights of RVE, S can be said to know, whereas S*’s 
true belief falls short of knowledge. In brief, I-RVE* captures the kind of epistemic 
individualism to which Sosa’s preferred version of RVE is committed. However, as we shall 
argue in the next section, the problem with I-RVE* is not about cases of intervening epistemic 
luck, but rather that this view cannot handle cases of environmental epistemic luck.7 
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3. AN EPISTEMIC TWIN EARTH SCENARIO 
 
 
We shall now argue that I-RVE* is incompatible with certain kinds of testimonial knowledge. 
That RVE faces a prima facie problem in accounting for such knowledge is familiar. What is less 
widely recognised is that the source of this problem stems from its commitment to the kind of 
epistemic individualism which I-RVE* captures. Here’s the intuitive problem. On standard views 
of testimonial knowledge, a hearer H can acquire such knowledge in suitable circumstances by 
largely trusting the word of the speaker S. Given that the kind of trust involved on behalf of H is 
one of epistemic reliance on S for knowledge, it seems inaccurate to say that H is primarily creditable 
for the relevant cognitive success. Indeed, H’s cognitive success seems much more attributable to 
S’s exercise of cognitive ability than her own. 
 
We can illustrate this point by adapting a familiar example offered by Jennifer Lackey: 
 
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the 
Sears Tower. He looks around, randomly approaches the first passerby that he sees, and asks 
how to get to his desired destination. The passerby, who happens to be a Chicago resident who 
knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears 
Tower. (Lackey 2007, 352) 
 
Lackey’s concern in offering this scenario is to motivate a much stronger conclusion than what 
interests us presently, in that she wants to contend that there are cases of testimonial 
knowledge where the agent’s cognitive success is in no significant way creditable to her 
cognitive agency. That’s why it’s important to the example that Morris is merely trusting the 
word of his informant.8 Whatever the merits of case, so construed, we want to interpret the 
Morris example somewhat differently. On our construal, while Morris is indeed largely trusting 
the word of another, he is also displaying some relevant cognitive abilities. 
 
Two kinds of cognitive ability in particular are on display. The first is that Morris is 
displaying some degree of cognitive ability when it comes to discerning trustworthy speakers 
from those that, relative to the target proposition, clearly are not to be trusted. That is, we are 
stipulating here that Morris wouldn’t ask just anyone, such as a very small child (indeed, he 
wouldn’t just ask any thing either, such as a lamppost). The second is that Morris is displaying 
some degree of cognitive ability in terms of how he responds to the testimony that’s offered, 
where this includes the manner in which it is offered. That is, we are stipulating that Morris is 
not the kind of epistemic subject who would simply believe anything he is told by his informant, 
no matter how outlandish, and no matter how it is presented. A further stipulation that we want 
to make about this case—which is likely implicit in Lackey’s rendering of it—is that Morris’s 
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cognitive environment is epistemically friendly in relevant respects. That is, this is a scenario 
where informants are plentiful, reliable, helpful, and so on. 
 
With the case so understood, we take it as uncontroversial that Morris has knowledge 
(unlike in the original case that Lackey formulates, which is more contentious). More precisely, 
insofar as we have as much testimonial knowledge as we take ourselves to have, then Morris had 
better be able to acquire knowledge in this way, as a lot of our testimonial knowledge is acquired 
in a similar fashion. The problem, however, is that given the degree of epistemic reliance 
involved in Morris’s acquisition of a true belief in this case, it isn’t plausible that his cognitive 
success is primarily creditable to his exercise of cognitive ability. That is, even though Morris is 
displaying some degree of relevant cognitive ability in this scenario, it is nonetheless the case 
that his cognitive success is more attributable to the cognitive agency of his informant rather 
than his cognitive agency. Even so, given that Morris is displaying a significant degree of 
relevant cognitive ability—i.e., he isn’t simply being gullible—and given also that he is in such an 
epistemically friendly environment in this regard, we take it that there is a strong intuition that 
Morris should be treated as having knowledge. 
 
The Morris case presents a prima facie problem for I-RVE*, according to which Morris’ 
knowledge would consist in the truth of his belief being through his own cognitive abilities—
i.e., an abilities (e.g., to discriminate between reliable and unreliable testifiers) that supervene 
on individualistic features of Morris. And yet, on the face of it, the truth of his belief is 
primarily creditable to someone else’s cognitive abilities.9 
 
Let’s now proceed to mount an argument showing that I-RVE* is in conflict with a key 
commitment of contemporary social epistemology. More precisely, our argument will show that, 
when understood individualistically, an individual’s cognitive ability to detect reliable informants 
cannot possibly ground testimonial knowledge. Here’s some background. Sandy Goldberg (2010; 
2011) distinguishes between direct and diffuse epistemic dependence. Roughly, the former happens 
when hearer H relies on speaker S such that changes in S’s epistemic perspective would make for 
changes in the epistemic properties of H’s beliefs. Testimony is a case in point when understood 
narrowly as a communicative exchange between S and H. The latter happens when variations in 
the practices and mental states of members of H’s community would make for variations in the 
epistemic properties of that community, even after subtracting the effects of any direct epistemic 
dependence H exhibits with respect to its members. Testimony is a case in point when more 
broadly understood in that testimonial exchanges give rise to knowledge only when communal 
parties other than S and H are involved in remotely monitoring and policing the exchanges in question. 
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In these cases, H epistemically depends on community-wide practices that secure a testimonial-
friendly environment by fostering reliable testifiers and rooting out unreliable testifiers. 
Now, let H be an ordinary epistemic individual embedded in an epistemic community 
GOOD in which most other speakers are reliable. In particular, not only does H possess an 
ability to discriminate between reliable and unreliable informants, H also regularly exercises 
that ability in the process of acquiring testimonial knowledge. Moreover, in GOOD the 
testimonial exchanges between H and various speakers are monitored and policed in a proper 
and timely fashion. Assume that H acquires knowledge upon accepting reliable speaker S’s 
testimony. The content of S’s knowledge pertains to an ordinary proposition which any reliable 
speaker will know. If I-RVE* is true, H acquires knowledge through her discriminatory ability. 
Now imagine that H is unwittingly transported to epistemic community BAD which also 
mostly contains reliable testifiers. The difference is that while the testimonial processes in 
GOOD are monitored and policed in a knowledge-enabling manner, the corresponding processes in 
BAD are monitored and policed in a knowledge-precluding manner vis-à-vis H. To wit, third-party 
epistemic individuals reliably ensure that H is mostly exposed to unreliable speakers. H has no 
inkling of the systematic way in which reliable informants are being screened-off from the 
testimonial processes. Most of the competent-looking speakers with whom H comes into 
contact are in fact not trustworthy. Assume that H forms a true belief on the basis of hearing 
reliable speaker S’s testimony. The proposition in question is again an ordinary one which every 
reliable speaker will know. 
 
The question is: does H acquire testimonial knowledge in BAD? Here’s an important 
reason to think that she does not. Knowledge requires a safe basis: if you believe truly on a certain 
basis, then not easily would you have formed a false belief on that same basis.10 Thus 
understood, H’s belief in GOOD is safe because not easily would H have acquired a false belief 
through testimony. Had H approached another informant, she would still have ended up with a 
true belief because nearly all the untrustworthy ones have been weeded out by the third-party 
members of GOOD. But H’s belief in BAD is unsafe. Very easily would H on the same basis 
have formed a false belief with the same content. H was fortunate that she ended up with a true 
testimonial belief due to the third-party members of BAD inadvertently letting a reliable 
informant slip through their net. Because most speakers with whom H conversationally interact 
are unreliable, had H formed the same belief on the basis of approaching a different informant, 
that belief would have been false. Consequently, H lacks knowledge in BAD. 
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If the foregoing is right, then H has knowledge in GOOD that she lacks in BAD. 
The pressing problem is whether that epistemic difference is down to a difference in (the 
manifestation of) cognitive ability when understood individualistically. Consider again: 
 
(I-RVE*)  
Necessarily, if individual S forms a belief which is true through manifesting cognitive 
disposition D, then S has individualistic feature I under local conditions L such that any 
individualistic duplicate S* who also forms that belief under L does so in such a way that its 
truth is through manifesting D. 
 
A friend of I-RVE* would then have it that in GOOD H forms a belief the truth of which is 
through exercising an ability to discriminate between reliable and unreliable testifiers. After all, 
the case is such that H reliably exercises that ability in GOOD. It follows from I-RVE* that H 
has individualistic feature I under local conditions L such that any individualistic duplicate of H 
who also forms that belief under L does so in such a way that its truth is through exercising that 
same ability. But given our description of GOOD and BAD, H in BAD is exactly such a 
duplicate. First off, H in GOOD and H in BAD are individualistically indiscernible, because H in 
GOOD is unwittingly transported into BAD. Second, the local conditions in GOOD and BAD 
are identical. In both cases does H form the same true belief on the basis of the very same piece 
of testimony. Remember that the speaker S is stipulated to be as reliable in BAD as S is in 
GOOD. It follows, by the lights of I-RVE*, that H in BAD also forms a belief in such a way that 
its truth is through exercising an ability to discern reliable testimony. But since H is clearly unable 
to discriminate between reliable and unreliable testifiers in BAD, the truth of H’s belief cannot be 
through exercising such ability. Rather, the truth of H’s belief in BAD is through environmental 
luck. Or more precisely, while the truth of H’s belief in BAD may to some extent be down to 
such a discriminatory ability, sheer luck is what primarily explains why H hits the truth. So, while 
a proponent of I-RVE* might insist that H in GOOD has knowledge, this view falsely predicts 
that so does H in BAD. In sum, our epistemic twin scenario involving GOOD and BAD 
presents a counterexample to I-RVE*.11 
 
 
 
4. INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY 
 
 
The foregoing shows that friends of RVE should dissociate themselves from the kind of 
epistemic individualism to which this view is typically wedded. Only then will they be able to 
offer a plausible account of direct and diffuse epistemic dependence. Exactly which particular 
shape an anti-individualistic version of RVE should take is not a question we shall settle here. §5 
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argues instead that combining virtue reliabilism with epistemic anti-individualism has 
consequences for which responsibilist virtues should be adopted and promoted in the pursuit of 
testimonial knowledge. Virtue reliabilism, remember, is a version of RVE according to which 
intellectual virtues should be understood as reliable cognitive abilities, and by ‘responsibilist 
virtues’ we have in mind refined character traits. But before that argument is presented, we must 
develop at least a rough account of the pertinent responsibilist virtue, namely intellectual humility. 
The remaining part of this section is devoted to such an account. 
 
Historically, the concept of humility has been used for a range of different purposes, 
primarily in various religious and philosophical contexts. We shall not attempt a comprehensive 
analysis of this multifaceted concept. Rather, our attention shall be restricted to an epistemic kind 
of humility—intellectual humility—which has to do with proper acknowledgement of the character 
of the cognitive abilities that are involved in producing or retaining knowledge.12 What exactly 
does such acknowledgement amount to? Dictionaries typically define humility negatively in terms 
of “the quality or state of not thinking you are better than other people”; “the quality of having a 
lowly opinion of oneself”; “the act or posture of lowering oneself in relation to others”13 This 
contemporary conception takes humility to imply esteeming oneself as no better than others. If 
transposed to an epistemic context, humility would be the quality of having a lowly view of 
one’s cognitive abilities vis-à-vis knowledge, and not regarding them as epistemically better than 
others’ cognitive abilities. However, on such an exclusively negative conception, intellectual 
humility is hard to conceive of as a virtue alongside other intellectual virtues—e.g., open-
mindedness, diligence, and so on. After all, if one’s cognitive abilities are genuinely better in an 
important epistemic respect when compared with other epistemic individuals, there why is there 
something virtuous about debasing or degrading one’s own abilities, in comparison with those 
individuals? To do so would hinder rather than further one’s epistemic pursuits by undermining 
the role that those abilities could play in generating or sustaining knowledge. 
 
Nevertheless, the said negative conception is onto something. Intellectual humility does 
have something to do with proper acknowledgement of the limitations and deficiencies of those 
cognitive abilities which normally lead to knowledge. Deliberate failure to acknowledge such 
boundaries and faults betrays an epistemic arrogance that is incompatible with intellectual 
humility. But being part of an accurate assessment of one’s cognitive abilities, such 
acknowledgement is different from epistemically lowering oneself in relation to others. Here’s 
an outline of our dual-aspect view of intellectual humility. 
 
We distinguish between two types of intellectual humility. Confidence humility concerns proper 
cognizing of the extensiveness and effectiveness of one’s cognitive abilities as they pertain 
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to knowledge. Such cognizance has two aspects. Firstly, a negative aspect in which one should 
recognize the existence of one’s cognitive imperfections as well as the limits of one’s cognitive 
merits. Ignoring or downplaying the presence of one’s cognitive flaws and overestimating one’s 
cognitive merits are both incompatible with intellectual humility. In other words, epistemically 
humble individuals neither ignore their cognitive shortcomings nor overrate their cognitive 
strengths vis-à-vis knowledge. To underestimate one’s flaws or overestimate one’s merits is to 
reveal an inflated conception of oneself as a potential subject of knowledge. Being humble in 
the epistemic sense rules out professing to have knowledge beyond what is licenced by one’s 
cognitive abilities. No intellectually humble individual is unnecessarily confident about their 
abilities to produce or sustain knowledge. 
 
Secondly, the proper cognizing of the extensiveness and effectiveness of one’s 
epistemically relevant cognitive abilities also has a positive aspect of equal importance in which 
one should recognize the genuine breath and depth of one’s abilities. Epistemically humble 
individuals do not underrate the role their cognitive abilities actually play in producing or 
sustaining knowledge, nor do they overrate the extent to which their cognitive faults prevent or 
undermine knowledge they might otherwise have had. To overestimate one’s cognitive failings or 
to underestimate one’s cognitive merits is to betray a deflated sense of self-worth with which 
intellectual humility is incompatible. Being intellectual humble rules out harboring such deep-
seated sense of distrust of one’s own cognitive abilities. Every humble individual is sufficiently 
confident about their abilities to produce or sustain knowledge.14 
 
Let’s now turn to a different type of intellectual humility. Whereas confidence humility is 
about correctly assessing the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own cognitive abilities so as to 
have enough but not too much confidence in their suitability for knowledge, attribution humility 
concerns proper inter-personal behavior in response to one’s accurate cognizance of those 
strengths and weaknesses, and in particular with regard to whose cognitive agency one’s 
cognitive successes should be attributed. Just as with confidence humility, attribution humility 
has two aspects. 
 
First, it has a negative aspect in which humble individuals do not overestimate the extent 
to which their cognitive successes are attributable to their cognitive agency. For example, they do 
not brag about knowledge they possess which is largely attributable to others people’s cognitive 
agency, let alone boasting about knowledge they lack. Rather, they will identify the cognitive 
resources of others and thereby acknowledge any important bearing they may have on their own 
cognitive successes. They will seek to draw with due respect more efficiently or extensively on 
others’ resources so as to further their own epistemic pursuits. 
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Second, attribution humility has a positive aspect in which humble individuals do not 
underestimate the extent to which their cognitive successes are attributable to their cognitive 
agency. To systematically falsely attribute one’s cognitive successes to other people’s cognitive 
agency would hinder one’s acquisition of knowledge by making one less willing to draw on 
one’s own cognitive resources in the pursuit of knowledge. In addition, one would likely be 
prevented from being flagged up as a reliable informant in one’s epistemic community. 
 
Let’s finally dwell on the dual-aspect of both confidence and attribution humility. Arguably, 
the negative aspects of both types are what most naturally characterize intellectual humility, but our 
contention is that the positive aspects are equally important parts of what it takes to be an 
intellectually humble individual. As a character trait intellectual humility is a responsibilist virtue, 
which involves both that one has enough but not too much confidence in one’s cognitive abilities to 
ensure they are utilized in ways that optimize knowledge, and that one appropriately attributes one’s 
cognitive successes to one’s cognitive agency. Without the negative aspects, one will overrate 
strengths and underrate weaknesses, and hence misapply one’s cognitive abilities accordingly. 
Consequently, one is likely to take undeserved credit for what others have cognitively achieved. 
Without the positive aspects, one will underrate strengths and overrate weaknesses, and hence fail to 
apply one’s cognitive abilities accordingly. Consequently, one is likely to miss out on deserved credit 
for what one could have cognitively achieved. 
 
Both aspects thus emphasize that intellectual humility has at least instrumental value in 
terms of being conducive to the acquisition of knowledge, but arguably also final value in terms 
of being a valuable character trait on its own. It is standardly held that intellectual humility is 
valuable even when abstracting away from particular epistemic benefits.15 Intellectual humility 
would lack either value if one either overreacted or underreacted to the presence of cognitive 
limitations and insufficiencies. In particular, to systematically overplay one’s cognitive faults 
induces irrational doubt about one’s cognitive abilities, which not only seriously undermines the 
acquisition of knowledge, but also engenders a sense of inferiority and self-depreciation. To 
belittle or disparage oneself in this way is to deprive one of a feature which otherwise would be 
praiseworthy on its own.16 
 
 
 
5. FROM EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM TO INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY 
 
 
Let’s take stock. In §2 we argued that robust virtue epistemology (RVE) has been wedded to 
epistemic individualism according to which the truth of an individual’s belief is because of (or 
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through) cognitive ability (or competence) only if any individualistic duplicate who forms the same 
belief under the same local circumstances does so in such a way that its truth is because of that same 
ability. Drawing on an epistemic twin scenario in the context of testimonial knowledge, we 
proceeded in §3 to build an argument against this individualistic version of RVE; what we called I-
RVE*. In the previous section we then sketched a dual-aspect view of intellectual humility. Whereas 
contemporary views typically restrict attention to the negative aspect in which humble individuals 
neither overrate their strengths nor underrate their weaknesses, our view emphasizes a positive 
aspect in which such individuals also neither underrate their strengths nor overrate their weaknesses. 
Both aspects apply to what we called confidence humility and attribution humility. In this section we 
develop an argument from epistemic anti-individualism to our preferred view of intellectual humility, 
which pertains to those cognitive abilities that are in play in testimonial exchanges between speakers, 
hearers and third-parties. 
 
Here’s the line of thought. Our epistemic twin scenario shows that the acquisition of 
testimonial knowledge largely through trust of an informant is not because of one’s exercise of 
cognitive agency (e.g., a cognitive ability to discriminate between good and bad testimony). Or, 
more precisely, while such agency, when construed individualistically, may play a minor 
(indispensible) role, the overarching role in accounting for the truth of the pertinent belief is 
played by the cognitive agency of others. But the extent to which an individual should rely on 
her cognitive abilities in the pursuit of knowledge should be proportionate to the role that those 
abilities actually play in accounting for the truth of that belief. So, the extent to which the hearer 
should rely on her own cognitive abilities is very small in comparison to the extent to which she 
is dependent on others’ cognitive abilities. But if a hearer in the main depends on the cognitive 
abilities of others when gaining knowledge via testimony, she should avoid being overly self-
reliant, and ought instead display a significant amount of intellectual humility with respect to her 
own individualistic abilities being able to produce such knowledge. So, a recipient of testimony 
should adopt a humble attitude in the pursuit of testimonial knowledge. 
 
Let’s formulate the foregoing more succinctly, so as to explain how the previous sections 
provide support for two of the premises. Here’s the argument: 
 
(P1) In the case of testimonial knowledge gained largely through trust of an informant, the 
hearer’s cognitive abilities (interpreted in accordance with I-RVE*) play a minor role in 
comparison to the much more prominent role that the speaker and third-parties’ 
cognitive abilities play in accounting for the truth of the hearer’s belief.  
(P2) The extent to which an individual should rely on—i.e., be confident in, and attribute her 
cognitive success to—her own cognitive abilities (interpreted in accordance with I-
RVE*) should be proportionate to the role that those cognitive abilities play in 
accounting for the truth of the pertinent belief. 
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(C1) So, in the case of testimonial knowledge gained largely through trust of an informant, the 
extent to which the hearer should be confident in, and attribute her cognitive success to, 
her own cognitive abilities (interpreted in accordance with I-RVE*) is very small in 
comparison to the extent to which she is dependent on others’ cognitive abilities.  
(P3) But if a hearer acquires testimonial knowledge by largely depending on the cognitive 
abilities of others, and therefore should adjust her confidence in, and her attribution 
of her cognitive success to, her own cognitive abilities (interpreted in accordance with 
I-RVE*), then the hearer ought to display some intellectual humility vis-à-vis her own 
cognitive abilities.  
(C2) So, a recipient of testimony should adopt an intellectually humble attitude in the pursuit 
of testimonial knowledge gained largely through trust of an informant. 
 
Let’s scrutinize the premises in turn. Premise (P1) is basically the upshot of our anti-individualist 
argument from §3. We first showed that in cases of direct epistemic dependence where a hearer 
acquires testimonial knowledge largely on the basis of the speaker’s say-so, it’s the speaker rather 
than the hearer’s cognitive abilities that are primarily responsible for the truth of the hearer’s 
belief. Following on from §2, I-RVE* is assumed throughout to hold of the relevant cognitive 
abilities, as RVE has typically gone hand-in-hand with epistemic individualism about such 
abilities. We then argued that in cases of diffuse epistemic dependence, the cognitive abilities of 
individuals who are not directly part of the testimonial exchanges also play an indispensable role 
in accounting for the truth of the hearer’s belief. We shall not here attempt to determine the 
degree to which the hearer is dependent on such third-parties. The key point is that in a wide 
range of cases of testimonial knowledge, the role played by the hearer’s cognitive abilities, when 
understood along the lines of I-RVE*, is relatively minor in comparison with the roles played by 
cognitive abilities of the speaker or third-parties to the testimonial exchanges. 
 
The second premise (P2) makes an independently plausible claim about how to proportion 
reliance on one’s epistemic sources. To rely on, or place trust in, a source of belief formation or 
retention—e.g., perception, memory, introspection or reasoning—is to have confidence in, or 
attribute reliability to, that source as a means to achieve one’s epistemic goals. Thus, if the goal is 
to acquire perceptual knowledge, then one relies on one’s perceptual apparatus if in normal 
circumstances one takes perceptual experiences to determine how to form perceptual beliefs— 
i.e., if one tends to base relevant beliefs on such experiences. Suppose that in actual fact 
perception is a highly reliable epistemic source in that a preponderance of one’s perceptual beliefs 
are true. In that case, what one rationally ought to do, given one’s epistemic goals, is to rely on 
one’s perceptual apparatus when circumstances are normal. Rationality requires that one adopt 
epistemic attitudes that promote one’s epistemic goals, such as maximizing knowledge 
acquisition. If instead perception is actually highly unreliable in that a high ratio of one’s 
perceptual beliefs are false, then given one’s epistemic goals one rationally ought to refrain from 
relying on one’s perceptual apparatus. (P2) pertains to a hybrid case where several distinct 
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epistemic sources contribute disproportionally to the truth of a given belief. In such a case, one 
rationally ought to proportion one’s reliance accordingly. Consider: 
 
Epistemic Proportionality  
If epistemic source X contributes significantly more than epistemic source Y to the truth of the 
belief that p, and one’s epistemic goal is to acquire knowledge that p, then one rationally ought 
to rely correspondingly more on X than on Y when forming the belief that p. 
 
Thus, given that the speaker and third-parties’ cognitive abilities contribute significantly more 
than the hearer’s ability to receive and evaluate testimonies, the hearer ought to adjust her 
reliance on those abilities accordingly if the goal is to acquire testimonial knowledge. If instead 
the hearer were to rely disproportionately if not exclusively on her own cognitive abilities, the 
epistemic goal is liable to be thwarted. Since she would then be relying on a cognitive ability for 
the formation of a belief well beyond the contribution that source yields to its truth, she is 
likely to form a belief on a basis that will lead her astray. 
 
The first conclusion (C1) follows straightforwardly from (P1) and (P2). Put the specific 
claim in (P1) about the disproportionate roles that the hearer and other’s cognitive abilities play 
in accounting for the truth of the hearer’s testimonial belief together with the general claim in 
(P2) about adjusting one’s reliance on a given cognitive ability to the role it genuinely plays vis-à-
vis the truth of the target belief. It follows that in the specific cases of testimonial knowledge 
that interest us the amount of trust the hearer should place in her own cognitive abilities should 
be significantly less than the degree to which she is dependent on others’ cognitive abilities. We 
assume throughout that the relevant cognitive abilities are construed along the lines of I-RVE*, 
that the relevant epistemic goal is the attainment of testimonial knowledge, and that to rely on 
testimonial exchanges is to take others say-so to inform or constrain the way in which one 
forms testimonial beliefs. 
 
Premise (P3) connects a claim about the extent to which one ought to rely on one’s 
cognitive abilities with a claim about intellectual humility. The connection is that if a hearer ought 
not rely very significantly on her own cognitive abilities (understood in accordance with I-RVE*) 
when it comes to their contribution to the truth of testimonial beliefs, then she ought to adopt an 
intellectually humble attitude in the pursuit of testimonial knowledge. For if the rational course of 
action is to place a very small amount of trust in the role that the hearer’s abilities play with 
regard to the truth of such beliefs, then she should properly acknowledge her limitations and 
deficiencies. As shown in §4, such acknowledgement constitutes one aspect of intellectual 
humility—i.e., neither overrate the strengths nor underrate the weaknesses of one’s cognitive 
abilities in the role they play in generating knowledge. On the other hand, while the hearer’s 
cognitive abilities to discriminate good from bad testimony play a relatively minor role in the 
16 
 
 
acquisition of testimonial knowledge, another aspect of intellectual humility has it that she should 
still properly acknowledge such a role, and so neither overrate the weaknesses nor underrate the 
strengths that those abilities play in filling it. Importantly, once the hearer realizes the relatively 
minor but non-negligible role her own cognitive abilities play in coming to possess testimonial 
knowledge, she ought to behave accordingly. Taking in the fact that she is heavily dependent on 
others’ cognitive contribution to the acquisition of such knowledge, the hearer ought to 
recognize that her cognitive success is more attributable to other people’s cognitive agency than 
her own, and then adopt an outward attitude of making more or better use of others’ abilities so 
as to promote testimonial knowledge. That’s not to say the hearer should refrain from attributing 
any part of her cognitive success to her own cognitive agency, since underestimating the extent 
of such an attribution is also incompatible with our notion of intellectual humility. 
 
The last step (C2) in our argument follows from (C1) and (P3) by modus ponens. Basically, 
if it is both the case that the degree to which our hearer should trust her own cognitive abilities is 
relatively small, and that the hearer ought to display some intellectual humility with regard to 
such abilities if she ought not trust those abilities to a very significant degree, then it follows that 
the hearer should adopt an intellectually humble attitude in the pursuit of (the relevant kind of) 
testimonial knowledge. That is to say, (P3) establishes the conditional that a hearer ought to 
display intellectual humility if she is largely depending on others’ cognitive abilities when 
acquiring (the relevant kind of) testimonial knowledge, and (C1) yields the antecedent of that 
conditional—i.e., that the hearer does so depend. The consequent (C2) follows—i.e., that our 
hearer should adopt an intellectual humble stance when seeking to obtain testimonial knowledge 
of this kind. 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Robust virtue epistemologists disagree over which intellectual virtues should take center stage in a 
viable account of knowledge: reliable cognitive abilities or refined character traits. In the context of a 
broad class of testimonial knowledge where a hearer depends directly on the speaker and diffusely on 
third parties to the testimonial exchange, the cognitive abilities of the hearer play a minor role in 
comparison with the abilities of others in regard to the truth of the target belief. An epistemic twin 
scenario was developed to show that what converts a true testimonial belief into knowledge fails to 
supervene on the hearer’s individualistic features. Having thus established epistemic anti-
individualism with respect to testimonial knowledge, we proceeded to sketch a 
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dual-aspect account of intellectual humility so as to mount an argument from this metaphysical 
view about the nature of cognitive abilities to a normative claim about such a virtuous character 
trait. While we agreed with the prevailing conception that intellectually humble individuals 
neither overstate their strengths nor understate their weaknesses, our contention was that such 
individuals also neither overstate their weaknesses nor understate their strengths. Importantly, 
given the direct and diffuse dependency theses, a hearer rationally ought to proportion her 
reliance on her own and others’ cognitive abilities accordingly—i.e., be confident enough but not 
overly confident in her own abilities with regard the truth of the target belief, and accurately mark 
the extent to which her cognitive successes are attributable to her cognitive agency or the 
cognitive agency of others. Since these features of confidence and attribution are definitive of 
intellectually humble individuals by the lights of our dual-aspect account, there is a compelling 
line of reasoning from epistemic anti-individualism to intellectual humility.17 
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NOTES 
 
1 That said, there is equally influential wing of virtue epistemology which explicitly eschews the project of offering 
a theory of knowledge. See, for example, Code (1987), Kvanvig (1992), Montmarquet (1993), Hookway (2003), 
and Roberts & Wood (2007).  
2 For a related proposal, see Greco (2009).   
3 For more on the distinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, see Axtell (1997) and 
Baehr (2006).   
4 This formulation makes RVE uniquely placed to deal with the problem of accounting for the special value of 
knowledge—i.e., the value that no state short of knowledge has. RVE has it that such value accrues from the fact 
that an achievement is being manifested, something which has at least prima facie final valuable, and which is not 
manifested in a cognitive performance that falls short of knowledge. For further discussion of the relationship 
between RVE and epistemic value, see Author2 (2009a). See also Author2 (2009b) and Author2 & Co-Authors 
(2010, chs. 1-4). For further discussion of the idea that achievements (cognitive or otherwise) might have a special 
value, see Author2 (2010). For further discussion of the topic of epistemic value more generally, see Author2 
(2007b) and Author2 & Co-Authors(2011).   
5 We shall henceforth assume that the relevant notion of supervenience is a weak one. Thus, if an individual S has 
cognitive ability A, then an internal physical duplicate S* of S also has A only if S and S* occupy the same possible 
world.  
6 As Greco (2007, 58) puts it, “there is a sense of ‘luck’ on which lucky success is precisely opposed to 
success through virtue or ability”.  
7 For further discussion of epistemic individualism, see Author1 & Author2 (forthcomingb).   
8 The reason for this is that Lackey is targeting a view often equated with RVE, but which is in fact importantly 
distinct. This is the so-called ‘credit view’—at one time defended by, for example, Greco (2003)—whereby knowing 
subjects are always deserving of credit (i.e., are praiseworthy) for their cognitive success. This clearly isn’t the same 
as the RVE thesis that when one knows one’s cognitive success is primarily creditable (i.e., attributable) to one, a 
thesis that makes no claim at all about whether the knowing subject is deserving of praise (though the two theses 
have sometimes been conflated in the literature). In any case, in objecting to the credit view, Lackey needs a case of 
testimonial knowledge where the subject deserved no praise for her cognitive success at all, and hence was merely 
trusting her informant.   
9 In fairness, Sosa (2007, 97) does suggest that in ordinary cases of testimonial knowledge, the cognitive success is 
“attributable to a complex social competence only partially seated in the individual believer.” Sosa doesn’t offer 
much elucidation of what such complex social competences amount to. Perhaps the idea is that in testimonial cases 
the cognitive success is primarily creditable to a social competence, which is displayed by the cognitive whole of a 
testifier-cum-testifiee. In any case, this proposal is antithetical to the spirit of RVE, which has it that S has 
knowledge just in case her cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. So construed, RVE is explicitly a 
form of epistemic individualism. To embrace wider social epistemic competences may have merit, but represents a 
radical departure from such individualism.   
10 For further defence of this claim, in the context of a broader anti-luck approach to knowledge, see Author2 
(2005; 2007a; 2015).  
11 For further discussion of epistemic twin earth arguments of this kind, and their wider significance for virtue-
based theories of knowledge, see Author1 & Author2 (2012; 2013; 2014; forthcominga). For further discussion of the 
distinction between intervening and environmental epistemic luck which underpins epistemic twin earth arguments, 
see Author2 (2009a; 2009b; 2012a) and Author2 & Co-Authors (2010, chs. 2-4).   
12 Note that intellectual humility is taken to be a character trait—i.e., a complex disposition to behave and cognize 
in a particular way in a range of social and non-social situations. Such a trait depends on, but is irreducible to, 
characteristic mental states and behaviors. Note also that intellectual humility contrasts with moral humility, which 
concerns a disinclination to exaggerate moral attributes, such as dispositions to act honestly and conscientiously.   
13 These quotes are online entries from Merriam-Webster, Oxford English Dictionary and Wikipedia, respectively.   
14 The positive aspects of humility can be traced back to Aquinas who took the “ground of humility to be one’s 
estimation of oneself according to truth.” (Pieper 1965, 188) Humility has no negative connotations on Aquinas’ 
view—i.e., there is no suggestion that humility involves an attitude of self-accusation or disparagement of oneself, 
or of cringing inferiority feelings.   
15 Intellectual humility can plausibly be seen as a constituent part of wisdom as a more encompassing theoretical virtue. 
Following Aristotle, the relevant kind of wisdom would be theoretical: “scientific knowledge, combined with 
intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature.” (Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1141b) Such wisdom requires 
deep understanding of first principles and underlying connections, rather than wide-ranging or narrow-minded, 
scientific expertise. In Plato’s Apology the oracle says that Socrates is the wisest of all men, but his wisdom consists 
in ignorance, in knowing that he apparently knows next to nothing. Wise people conduct their epistemic enquiries 
diligently and open-mindedly. They are reflective, thorough and fully aware of their own fallibility. They have 
confidence in own abilities to make good judgments, but are not overly self-confident or abrasive. More recently,  
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Zagzebski (1996, 49-50) defines theoretical wisdom as a non-propositional kind of understanding that “is a matter 
of grasping the whole structure of reality”.  
16 Our dual-aspect account of intellectual humility differs markedly from other current views. Hazlett (2012) takes 
intellectual humility to consist in a disposition to form proper higher-order beliefs about the epistemic statuses of 
one’s beliefs. Driver (2001) sees intellectual humility as a disposition to underestimate self-worth to some limited 
extent, in spite of the available evidence. Roberts & Wood (2007) regards intellectual humility as consisting in a 
disposition to have an unusually low concern for one’s own intellectual status and entitlements. And Battaly et al 
(forthcoming) conceive of intellectual humility in terms of proper attentiveness to and owning of one’s intellectual 
limitations, which involves a dispositional profile to do with cognitive, motivational and affective responses to an 
awareness of such limitations. This limitations-owning view has the most affinities with our dual-aspect account, but 
there are at least two crucial differences. The former denies that humility consists even partially in owning one’s 
intellectual strengths, and it fails to recognize that humility has a social or inter-personal dimension.   
17 Acknowledgements.  
